

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 IO-03 PM-03

NSC-05 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-10 EUR-08 SP-02

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O P 151750Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4600

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3250

LIMDIS

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, MILI, JO, IS, SY

SUBJ: JORDAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

REFS: (A) USDAO TEL AVIV 0660 (NOTAL) (B) TEL AVIV 2647 (NOTAL)

(C) FBIS TA 131516 (NOTAL) (D) FBIS TA 131935 (NOTAL) (E)

TEL AVIV 2956 (NOTAL) (F) USDAO TEL AVIV 0836 (NOTAL) (G)

USDAO AMMAN 0217 (NOTAL) (H) USDAO AMMAN 0218 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ISRAEL AND ELSEWHERE  
HAVE HIGHLIGHTED TWO ASPECTS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES:  
INCREASED DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES (ARMOR) IN THE JORDAN VALLEY

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AND ITS SURROUNDING AREA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A JORDAN SYRIA

MILITARY COMMAND. AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW, WE FIND BOTH ALLEGATIONS IF NOT COMPLETELY FALSE, ACCORDING TO BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, THEN AT BEST HIGHLY OVERDRAWN. WE HAVE SEEN ONLY MINOR MILITARY MOVES; THERE IS NO MILITARY ALERT. WE FIND THE REASONS BEHIND THIS CAMPAIGN OF ISRAELI (DEFMIN PERES) PUBLIC STATEMENTS INTERESTING AND AGREE WITH TEL AVIV THAT REINFORCING PERES OWN INTERNAL POLITICAL POSITION, AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNALING THAT THE WEST BANK IS OUT OF THE NEGOTIATING AREA SEEM TO BE PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS ACTIVITY. IN ADDITION SUCH ALLEGATIONS HELP TO SUSTAIN A STAND AGAINST FURTHER ISRAELI NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY AND ALSO TO ATTACK THE RELATIVELY MODERATE STATEMENTS WHICH KING MAD EIN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO US. CERTAINLY ALLEGATIONS THAT JORDAN IS MOVING ARMOR INTO VALLEY AND HAS FORMED A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH SYRIA WOULD HELP TO DISCOUNT STATED WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH A FULL PEACE IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN 1967. THERE MAY WELL ALSO BE MISCALUCLATIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS ON BOTH SIDES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE. END SUMMARY.

2. AS TO THE FACTS IN THE PRESENT SERIES OF PUBLIC EXCHANGES: TWO SETS OF ACTIVITY SEEM TO BE OF CONCERN - STEPPTD UP JORDANIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY ALONG THE JORDAN VALLEY AND A MILITARY COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WITH SYRIA.

3. THE VALLEY: ISRAELI ACTIVITY SEEMS TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO JORDANIAN ACTIONS. AS EARLY AS SIX WEEKS AGO, JORDANIANS NOTED FOR US WHAT THEY TOOK TO BE STEPPED UP ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK. WE DID NOT QUESTION THEM ON THE EXACT SPECIFICS, BUT THEY SPOKE OF FORTIFICATIONS UNDER CONSTRUCTION. INCREASED ISRAELI OPERATIONS AGAINST EXPECTED FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS COULD HAVE BEEN ONE POSSIBLE CAUSE. ADDITIONALLY, PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HEAVY ISRAELI CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY ALONG THE RIDGE LINE IN CONNECTION WITH AIR SURVEILLANCE RADARS COULD HAVE COME TO JORDANIAN ATTENTION. FINALLY, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE SEEN A STEP UP IN ACTIVITY WHICH OUR OWN ROAD RECONAISSANCE HAS MISSED. ON THE EAST BANK, AS REFS G AND H MAKE CLEAR, IN A ROAD RECONAISSANCE TODAY, WE HAVE NOTED VERY LITTLE CHANGE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE OF COURSE THT WE HAVE MISSED SOMETHING

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IMPORTANT WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE PICKED UP. HOWEVER, JORDANIANS ARE CLEARLY NOT IN AN ALERT STATUS AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE MISSED MAJOR CHANGES. ONLY REAL CHANGE WHICH WE HAVE SEEN WAS DISPLACEMENT OF FOUR M-60 TANKS OF THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION FROM GUARD DUTY AT A RADAR SITE NEAR AMMAN (SWEILEH) TO A POSITION ON THE NAUR - JERUSALEM ROAD APPROXIMATELY AT THE SEA LEVEL CONTOUR. EARLIER ONE SUCH TANK WAS SEEN ON THE SALT SHUNA ROAD COVERING THE FORWARD SLOPE OF THE VALLEY.

GOJ HAS ADMITTED SOME SLIGHT INCREASE IN ACTIVITY (REF G), BUT PROVIDED US WITH NO DETAILS. WE BELIEVE THAT IS IS POSSIBLE THESE TANKS WHICH WERE NOT DISPERSED IN A TACTICAL MANNER IN THE FIELD MAY WELL BE USED TO BOLSTER JAF ANTI-INFILTRATION EFFORTS IN VIEW OF AN EXPECTED INCREASE IN SUCH ACTIVITY IN THE DAYS AHEAD ON THE PART OF THE GOJ. WHILE IT IS NOT THE SIMPLEST METHOD FOR IMPROVING NIGHT VISIMION, THE INFRA-RED DEVICES AND SEARCHLIGHTS ON THE M-60'S ARE THE ONLY ONES WHICH THE JAF HAS.

4. THE SYRIAN CONNECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT GOJ LEADERS MAY WELL HAVE FLIRTED WITH THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMAND WITH SYRIA DURING KING'S APRIL VISIT, BUT THAT THEY HAVE DEFINITELY PULLED BACK FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. STEP WOULD BE VERY UNPOPULAR IN MILITARY HERE WHICH HAS LONG MEMORY FOR SYRIAN TANK ATTACK IN 1970. FURTHER, KING AND PRIME MINISTER SEEM TO ACCEPT IDEA THAT IF THEY ARE WORRIED BY ISRAELI FLANK ATTACK THROUGH JORDAN

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O P 151750Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4601

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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AGAINST SYRIA IN THE EVENT OF WAR, PRESENCE OF SYRIAN FORCES  
IN JORDAN OR A JOINT COMMAND WOULD BE PERFECT ISRAELI EXCUSE  
FOR DOING SO. SINCE KING'S TRIP WE HAVE SEEN NUMBER OF PUBLIC  
DENIALS OF FACT THAT COMMAND EXISTS, BOTH IN PARIS AND IN  
WASHINGTON. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THESE, BUT DO NOTE THAT  
JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITIES  
OF GREATER "COORDINATION" WITH SYRIAN FORCES, LOOKING TOWARD  
THEIR OWN CONCERNS THAT CONFLICT NOW MORE LIKELY WITH SUSPENSION  
OF SECRETARY'S LAST EFFORT IN MARCH. ALSO NOT BEYOND REALM OF  
POSSIBILITY THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS  
IS A PARTIAL REFLECTION OF POSITION WHICH JORDANIANS TOOK PRIOR  
TO THEIR WASHINGTON VISIT THAT IF US UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO  
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SUPPLY JORDAN WITH SOME AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT IT WOULD BE FORCED  
TO TURN ELSEWHERE, PREFERRABLY TO SAUDIS TO BORROW HAWK, OR  
SECONDARILY TO SYRIA AND EVEN SOVIETS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE LATTER  
IS A LIVE POSSIBILITY NOW. JORDANIANS, AS NOTED ABOVE, REALIZE  
THAT A SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN JORDAN WOULD BE UNPOPULAR  
LOCALLY AND AN OPEN INVITATION TO ISRAEL TO CONSIDER JORDAN FAIR  
GAME. THEY WOULD ALSO NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE PRESENCE OF  
SOVIETS WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD BE INEVITABLE SHOULD THEY TRY  
TO ACQUIRE SOVIET AIR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. IN ANY EVENT,  
JORDANIANS CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO US THAT TYEY DO NOT WIDH TO  
BEGIO, OR TO ENGAGE IN, HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL.  
KING REMEMBERS PAINFUL LOSS OF WEST BANK IN 1967 AND THIS WAS  
PRIME FACTOR IN HIS HANGING BACK FROM ENGAGEMENT IN 1973  
UNTIL LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THEREFORE, ON BASIS ON WHAT WE  
HAVE SEEN IN PRESENT MINOR CHANGE IN JORDAN MILITARY POSTURE,  
AND PAST ACTIONS OF GOJ, PERES STATEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING,  
WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GOI ACTUALLY FEARS JORDANIAN ATTACK,  
AND THAT STATEMENTS MUST SERVE OTHER PURPOSES.

5. WE LEAVE TO TEL AVIV COMMENTS ON EFFECT ON ISRAELI INTERNAL  
POLITICAL SITUATION OF PERES'S STATEMENTS. WE FIND ASSESSMENT  
PERSUASIVE THAT PERES MAY BE SEEKING TO SOLIDIFY CONSENSUS IN  
ISRAEL AND ELSEWHERE THAT WEST BANK IS NOT A SUITABLE SUBJECT  
FOR NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT MOST ARABS CONSIDER  
THAT POSSIBILITY EQUALLY REMOTE GIVEN PRESENT DEEP ANTAGANISM  
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PLO. WE ALSO SEE STATEMENTS AS REINFORCING  
ISRAEL'S PRESENT POSITION AGAINST SHOWING ANY INCREASED  
NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY BY ALLEGING THAT JORDAN PREPARING FOR WAR.  
WE SHOULD ADD HERE THAT PERES AND PRESS IN GENERAL HAS FOUND  
IT USEFUL TO FORGET THAT KING HAS BEEN MOST CAREFUL WHEN TALKING  
ABOUT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IN TERMS THAT MAKE CLEAR HIS FEAR THAT

JORDAN WILL BE INEVITABLY DRAWN INTO ANY CONFLICT AND INSTEAD ARE BEGINNING TO ALLEGE THAT HE HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO AN ACTIVE ROLE. JORDANIANS HAVE CLEAR CONCERN THAT THEIR COUNTRY WILL BECOME AN AVENUE FOR AN ISRAELI LIGHTENING FLANK ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT. THEY POINT TO EXTENSIVE USE WHICH ISRAELIS MADE OF THEIR AIRSPACE IN 1973 LONG BEFORE THEY WERE INVOLVED ON GROUND FOR JUST THIS PURPOSE AND ARE UNHAPPY WITH INCREASED ISRAELI AERIAL RECONAISSANCE ACTIVITIES OVER JORDAN WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE RECENTLY.

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6. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PERES FINDS THESE RECENT STATEMENTS USEFUL IN COUNTERBALANCING POINTS WHICH KING HAS BEEN MAKING IN THE UNITES STATES RECENTLY THAT HE AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS (ASAD AND SADAT) WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT ISRAEL RECOGNITION, NON BELLIGERENCY, THE RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN RECOGNIZED BORDERS AND BE WILLING TO MAKE AND SUPPORT A FINAL PEACE, IF ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRIOTY OCCUPIED IN 1967. WE SUGGEST THEN THAT THE PICTURE WHICH PERES PAINTS OF JORDAN IS QUITE POSSIBLY DESIGNED TO UNDERCUT THIS POSITION WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.  
PICKERING

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## Message Attributes

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